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Subject: What kind of international economic context will a President Bush or a President 
Kerry face? What does it imply for either candidate’s future potential room for 
manoeuvre? 
 
Summary: At first glance the international economic scenario does appear rosier than 
ever. Synchronized world growth this year has produced the fastest global growth rate in a 
generation. Nevertheless, a number of lingering weaknesses and new threats will reduce 
the responsible room for manoeuvre for the next US president, regardless of who actually 
occupies the White House in 2005. The list of international economic challenges and 
threats include high oil prices, flimsy foundations for recovery or continued growth in 
most of the major economic zones, deepening global macroeconomic imbalances, the 
spectre of a dollar crisis and the threat of renewed protectionist pressures. Neither Bush 
nor Kerry would have it easy 
 
 
Analysis: Despite the clear differences between the economic visions and policy 
orientations of Bush and Kerry, either candidate will likely face a difficult economic 
scenario. This might come as a surprise to the many who believe the US is currently 
experiencing a strong economic recovery. Nevertheless, the economy now finds itself in a 
paradoxical situation. Currently the world economy is experiencing growth of around 5%, 
one of the fastest collective paces in over a generation. What is more, nearly all of the 
major economic zones of the world are growing together in a synchronous fashion, 
something which has not occurred in recent memory. The US and China –growing at 
annual rates of 5% and 9%, respectively– along with some other emerging markets, are 
leading the charge, but even Japan, Europe and Latin America are showing signs of 
recovery. At first glance, this would normally be very good news. However, there are a 
number of challenges facing the world economy and several vulnerabilities which should 
be haunting even the most optimistic (see Fred Bergsten, ‘The Risks Ahead for the World 
Economy’, The Economist, 11 September 2004). 
 
Oil Prices 
First, there is the high price of oil. Oil prices have risen nearly two-thirds during the 
current year alone, reaching levels above US$55 per barrel for West Texas International 
and above US$52 per barrel for Brent crude. Although both benchmarks have given back 
about US$5 from their peaks during recent days, the short-term outlook is not rosy. The 
reasons for this year’s price increase are manifold and well-known, ranging from the 
uncertainties surrounding many of the world’s oil-producing regions (including the Middle 
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East, Russia, Norway, Venezuela and Nigeria) to hurricane disruption in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean. 
 
Such typically passing factors have all converged during a year of historical high demand 
and rapid oil consumption growth, a product of the current synchronized global growth 
boom. Furthermore, there has been a particular dearth of both upstream and downstream 
investment in recent years on the part of the energy industry. While this trend seems to be 
reversing, there is no guarantee that enough new pumping and refinery capacity will come 
on line quickly enough to avoid significant damage to world growth. After all, the world’s 
spare oil production capacity (down to just over one million barrels a day) is now at an all-
time low, approaching a mere 1% of total output. Even at the height of the oil shock in the 
1970s, the world system enjoyed about 3% space capacity. But even if oil prices do 
subside from today’s high levels, it is unlikely that OPEC countries will allow prices to fall 
as low as the traditional US$25 target. With the dollar weakening, OPEC countries –
already facing tougher budget and debt scenarios and rising domestic demands for social 
spending– are now suffering from declining dollar purchasing power. If and when output 
capacity does increase again, OPEC is likely to target the world price at somewhere above 
US$30. Therefore, the most likely eventual equilibrium would imply somewhat higher oil 
prices and slower growth than traditionally expected, at least for some time. 
 
The Fragile World Recovery 
Second, the world recovery remains fragile. Given lacklustre employment creation, weak 
personal income gains (still below consumption increases), low personal savings rates and 
high and rising household debt levels, the underpinnings of the US recovery remain weak. 
China is already facing the beginning of a slowdown and still runs the risk of a hard 
landing. The recoveries in Japan, Europe and Latin America remain fragile and export-led, 
while domestic demand lags dangerously behind, making these regions hostages to both 
currency appreciation and growth slowdown in the US and China. All of these regional 
fragilities could feed one other, and each could deteriorate further under the weight of high 
oil prices. 
 
Dangerous Global Imbalances 
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Third, the deepening of global macroeconomic imbalances has made the world economy 
more vulnerable to either a significant growth slowdown or a dollar crisis –or both–. The 
US current account deficit is now running at an annual level of US$600 billion, 
equivalent to nearly 6% of GDP and accounting for nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
current account surpluses. Furthermore, while the 2001 recession did nothing to reverse 
the deficit trend, the US current account deficit has moved from being primarily generated 
and financed by the private sector (suggesting its sustainability) to being generated 
increasingly by US public deficits and financed almost exclusively by public actors such 
as Asian central banks, particularly China’s (bringing into question its sustainability). 
Typically, this situation would suggest that the dollar must fall, either sooner (in a more 
gradual fashion) or later (in a more abrupt and destabilizing fashion). But given that 
private investors have already begun to shy away from continuing to finance the US’s 
external deficit, some analysts have begun to point to an alternative explanation as to why 
the US current account deficit can continue to grow and still be sustainable for another 20 
years or so (see, for example, Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter 
Garber, ‘An Essay on the Revised Bretton Woods System’, NBER Working Paper nr. 
w9971, September 2003, along with other more recent NBER papers by the same 
authors). 




Under the so-called Bretton Woods II informal arrangement, China’s fixed exchange rate 
for the yuan (CNY8.28/US$1.00) –probably undervalued– allows China to continue to 
support an export-led growth model which is fed by excess domestic demand in the US. 
The result is a growing Chinese trade surplus with the US and a growing US current 
account deficit. On the other hand, this arrangement allows China to continue growing at 
rapid rates, absorb excess labour from the countryside into booming industrial export 
sectors which, while exporting to the US, import inputs from China’s neighbours, 
including Japan, allowing China to pull the rest of Asia’s export-led growth models with 
it. Because the Chinese regime faces the imperative of maintaining political stability and 
economic growth, it has an enormous incentive to maintain an undervalued fixed 
exchange rate for the yuan against the dollar. This requires it to accumulate dollar 
reserves and to use them to purchase US treasury bonds. This, in turn –together with 
similar behaviour by the Japanese and other Asians–, allows the US to finance its growing 
budget and current account deficits in general and in particular the growing imports from 
Asia and the increasing military costs associated with the Iraq intervention in particular. 
 
Proponents of this de facto Bretton Woods II arrangement argue that it allows for both 
Asia to grow rapidly and for the US to continue serving as the world’s growth engine 
sustainably into the future, despite growing internal and external imbalances that would 
normally presage a significant negative adjustment even for an advanced economy. Their 
conclusion is that not only should a growing US current account deficit NOT be viewed 
with alarm, but that it should actually be welcomed as a new paradigm allowing for 
developing Asia to emerge from the periphery into the core of the world economy. 
 
However, this is a very risky proposition. First, not everyone will be happy with this 
arrangement. As the US external deficit continues rising, the natural adjustment process, 
unable to occur vis-à-vis Asia, will take place increasingly with respect to Europe, 
pushing up the euro against the dollar. Dollar depreciation will therefore place increasing 
pressure on Europe’s industrial export base which, despite even the euro’s recent 
appreciation, continues to be the pillar of Europe’s fragile recovery. Secondly, while 
Europe might be the most disgruntled party, there are other weak links in the chain. 
Developing countries, particularly in Asia, will be increasingly exposed to a significant 
capital loss on their growing dollar reserves should this de facto system of financial and 
trade flows break down, provoking a strong depreciation of the dollar. Each country 
accumulating dollars will face a growing incentive to free-ride and bolt from the system 
before it collapses, diversifying its reserves away from the dollar and no longer 
contributing to the financing of the US external deficit. Given that the system is not built 
on a formal set of accepted mutual obligations, it will always be inherently unstable. 
Bretton Woods I at least had strong international economic governance underpinnings. 
Bretton Woods II does not. 
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Third, after Asia, the next largest financier of US deficits is the bloc of oil producing 
countries, including OPEC. These countries, too, will experience growing incentives to 
diversify their holdings, and perhaps will even considering finally shifting the defining 
currency of their oil industries from the dollar to the euro. As many of the major energy 
producers are highly and increasingly integrated with the European economy in terms of 
trade, further adjustment forced onto the euro will imply ever declining international 
purchasing power for oil exporters. To the extent that Bretton Woods II (essentially a US-
Asian affair) continues, the pressure on oil exporters to consider changes will increase. 
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Finally, while this arrangement might appear to be of extreme convenience to both the US 
and Asia, particularly China, it is not clear that it is a symmetrical symbiotic relationship. 
While it allows the US to continue to go further into debt (both domestically and 
internationally), and allows China to continue to grow rapidly and absorb excess labour, 
ultimately China holds the cards. If the US does not take the lead in reducing its deficits, 
then China will have the power to decide exactly when it no longer needs to accumulate 
dollar reserves. While this might be an economic version of the Cold War’s ‘peaceful 
coexistence’, unlike in the détente of the 1970s, in this case the US would seem to be 
willingly assuming the role of the more vulnerable partner. In the final analysis, although 
the newly-touted Bretton Woods II may have provided some margin for the US to 
continue with unsustainable behaviour, it does not herald a new paradigm in which 
deficits do not matter and the dollar cannot crash. Just remember ‘the end of history’ and 
‘the end of the business cycle’ claims of the 1990s. 
 
The Threat of Protectionism 
Fourth, and finally, another threat to the world economy is the fragile state of international 
trade negotiations and the emergence of protectionist pressures. As the dollar remains 
overvalued against the Asian currencies, and as the euro becomes increasingly overvalued 
against the dollar, protectionist sentiment could easily increase in the US and Europe, the 
world’s two most important trading blocs and the world’s key trade negotiators. Without 
astute leadership by, and credible consensus between, the US and Europe, the WTO’s 
Doha Round of trade negotiations have almost no chance of success. Furthermore, in the 
face of rising protectionist sentiment, even the regional trade accords being pushed by the 
US and the EU will likely flounder. A breakdown of current negotiations might be 
absorbed by the international economy, but an outbreak of new protectionism, given the 
current fragile and unbalanced nature of the world economy, could be disastrous. 
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Conclusion: This difficult international economic scenario will make both domestic and 
international economic policy for the next president a supreme challenge. Under almost 
any scenario, it will become increasingly difficult and dangerous to keep growth in the US 
above 3%. Any attempt to use policy to keep the recovery strong in the US is likely only to 
postpone a global crisis and feed its proportions. Any attempt to use policy to ultimately 
head off a crisis implies accepting, sooner rather than later, even slower growth for an 
extended period of time, possibly aggravating the employment situation in the US and 
feeding protectionist sentiment. While either Bush or Kerry is likely to face an increasing 
reticence from both Congress and the Federal Reserve to continue accommodating a policy 
designed to extend the recovery at the current high growth rates, each candidate would 
probably be inclined to handle this situation in different ways. This allows us to explore in 
Part III what would be the likely extreme scenarios under a Bush or Kerry presidency. 
